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Abstract 
The last two decades have seen considerable efforts directed towards making elec-
tronic health records interoperable through improvements in medical ontologies, 
terminologies and coding systems. Unfortunately, these efforts have been hampered 
by a number of influential ideas inherited from the work of Eugen Wüster, the father 
of terminology standardization and the founder of ISO TC 37. We here survey 
Wüster’s ideas – which see terminology work as being focused on the classification 
of concepts in people’s minds – and we argue that they serve still as the basis for a 
series of influential confusions. We argue further that an ontology based 
unambiguously, not on concepts, but on the classification of entities in reality can, 
by removing these confusions, make a vital contribution to ensuring the 
interoperability of coding systems and healthcare records in the future.  
1. Introduction 
The goal of an electronic health record (EHR) is to achieve faithful clinical data entry in 
such a way as to meet the requirements of communicability for both human and machine. 
[1] To this end much emphasis has been placed on clinical coding, with the rationale that it 
is codes that will make it possible to associate with the terms used by humans in expressing 
patient data the sorts of uniform syntax and precise meanings that can be interpreted by 
software. Code-based terminologies now exist in many different flavours. The Unified 
Medical Language System contains in its MetaThesaurus over 100 such systems, which are 
said to comprehend in all some 3 million medical “concepts” [2].  
On the EHR front, too, progress is being made. CEN/TC251 has brought Europe-wide 
acceptance of the need for a comprehensive, communicable and secure EHR as a 
prerequisite for the delivery of high-quality healthcare, and this European vision has gained 
international acceptance, leading to the establishment of new standards at the ISO level [3]. 
As we shall show, however, the realization of this vision is stymied by the fact that the new 
standards inherit from the earlier work of ISO Technical Committee (TC) 37 a fundamental 
incoherence.
ISO TC 37 was founded in 1951, largely through the efforts of a certain Eugen Wüster 
(1898–1977), an Austrian businessman, saw-manufacturer, professor of woodworking 
machinery, and devotee of Esperanto, who ran the secretariat of TC 37 for the first decades 
of its existence. [4] Wüster was principal author of almost all the seminal documents on 
terminology standardization and thus responsible for very many of the ideas which, because 
of ISO’s rules governing re-use of prior standards, have been propagated in ever widening 
circles ever since. Given this astonishing influence, it is worth spending some time to 
convey the flavour of Wüster’s thinking.  
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First, we need to note that four distinct views of concepts can be distinguished in the 
literature. On the psychological view concepts are mental entities, analogous to ideas or 
beliefs; on the linguistic view concepts are the (somehow regimented) meanings of general 
terms; on the epistemological view concepts are units of knowledge (as this term is used in 
phrases such as ‘knowledge representation’); and finally, on what some might call the 
‘ontological’ view, concepts are abstractions of kinds, attributes or properties (i.e. of 
general invariant patterns on the side of entities in the world). Sadly, elements of all four 
views are found mixed up together in almost all terminology-focused work in informatics 
today. [5]
Wüster himself is a proponent of the psychological view. Our knowledge of concepts, he 
tells us [6], is rooted in the experiences of the new-born infant, which finds itself 
“constantly amidst a panoply of diverse sensory impressions”. The child begins thereupon 
to mentally sub-divide this sensory mosaic into individual objects (and Wüster stresses 
repeatedly in this connection that objects in reality are constructed by human beings, and 
that there is a high degree of arbitrariness and variability to such construction). The child 
can thereafter also remember objects, such memories constituting what Wüster calls 
“individual concepts”. Examples are: “‘Napoleon’ or the concept of my fountain pen.” [6] 
If, as Wüster would have it, “a speaker wishes to draw the attention of an interlocutor to a 
particular individual object, which is visible to both parties or which he carries with him, he 
only has to point to it”. Otherwise, however, “the only thing available is the individual 
concept of the object, provided that it is readily accessible in the heads of both persons.” 
(Those engaged in communication about, say, Napoleon, are thus somehow required to 
gain access to the interiors of each other’s heads.)  
In the course of time, the child notices that some individual objects – e.g. apples, or bricks, 
or cans of paint – are “interchangeably alike” and are given the same name by older 
speakers of the language. “The child learns to blend the individual concepts of such objects 
in its thinking” and thus arrives at general concepts, which are, like individual concepts 
“thought (= mental) objects. They exist only in the heads of people.” As individual 
concepts can be grouped together into general concepts, so general concepts can be grouped 
together into concepts of higher degrees of abstraction, as when we move from the general 
concept apple to the superordinate concept fruit. The formation of concepts at these higher 
levels, too, Wüster thinks, is “highly dependent on human discretion.”  
Terminology work is designed to provide clear delineations in this “realm” of concepts via 
definitions [7], and Wüster thinks that terms can be assigned to concepts only when such 
definitions have been formulated. (How else, after all, are we to gain access to the denizens 
of this strangely ethereal realm?)  
2. Concepts and Characteristics 
Wüster’s account of concept learning and his insistence on the arbitrariness of concept-
formation have long since been called into question by cognitive scientists. Even very small 
children manifest in surprisingly uniform ways an ability to apprehend objects in their 
surroundings as instances of natural kinds – in ways which go far beyond what they 
apprehend in sensory experience. There is now much evidence (e.g. in [8]) to the effect 
that, for objects in the biological realm, this ability rests on a shared innate capacity to 
apprehend the surrounding world in terms of underlying structures or powers. The latter are 
invisible to the child, but adults may learn to recognize them as structures of a molecular 
sort.
Wüster’s idea according to which, before we can assign a term to a concept, we must first 
“delineate” the concept, is also open to serious objections. To delineate means: to list the 
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totality of “characteristics” which form a concept’s content or intension. Unfortunately 
Wüster provides conflicting elucidations of what such “characteristics” might be [7], 
conceiving them sometimes as if they were themselves concepts (so that, like other 
concepts, they would exist in the heads of people), and at other times as properties of 
objects existing in the world. (This is in keeping with the general failure to discriminate 
clearly between objects and concepts which runs through all of Wüster’s thinking.)
Some recent terminology work is clearer in this respect [9]. Unfortunately, however, even 
in more recent ISO documents [10] the problems still linger, since the relevant communities 
have still to find a coherent means by which concepts and their characteristics should 
somehow span the divide between concepts as creatures of the mind and as properties of 
objects in the world. This lingering incoherence, which spreads also independently of ISO’s 
influence [11], explains why so many terminologies contain certain characteristic families 
of errors in coding and documentation which flow from the fact that those involved in their 
authoring and maintenance are unsure as to whether their task is the representation of ideas
in people’s heads, meanings of words, consensus knowledge of experts in a discipline or
types of entities in the world [5]. Consider for example the definition of disorder that we 
find in SNOMED: “Disorders are concepts [!] in which there is an explicit or implicit 
pathological process causing a state of disease which tends to exist for a significant length 
of time under ordinary circumstances.” [12, p. 23]. Taken together with SNOMED’s 
definition of concepts as “unique units of thought” [12, p. 11], this would seem to imply 
that all disorders are imagined. 
3. Wüsterian Medicine 
Wüster’s assumption to the effect that concepts are formed through the application of 
human discretion to perceived similarities may have led some to suppose that his ideas are 
well-suited to the area of medical terminology, which is after all subject to the constant 
coinage of novel terms. Unfortunately, however, there is one prominent feature of medical 
reality which makes Wüster’s approach here inapposite. For in medicine we often have to 
deal with families of entities in reality in relation to which we are able to grasp few 
characteristics “identifiable in encounters of similars”, and certainly too few to allow 
definitions of the corresponding concepts. (It is in part for this reason that some 85% of 
SNOMED-CT’s concepts remain in its July 2003 version [12] undefined.)
Consider, for example, a tumour. This starts out as initially undetectable mutations in a 
small number of cells and then becomes transformed by degrees into a full-fledged object 
on the scale of coarse anatomy. For very many types of pathogenic process it seems at best 
simplistic to suppose that we could isolate in perception certain “essential properties” 
which could be identified in definitions as the “characteristics” of corresponding general 
concepts. That the detection, classification and diagnosis of such processes involves to such 
a high degree the application of statistical techniques is already a sign of the fact that we are 
dealing here with patterns in reality which go beyond the realm of concepts as this is 
conceived, in Wüsterian fashion, in terms of lists of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The reason for this miscalibration turns on the fact that the Wüsterian notion of concept 
has nothing to do with medicine (or biology) at all. Wüster and his early TC 37 colleagues 
were concerned primarily with standardisation in the domain of commercial artefacts, and 
especially of manufactured products. Wüster himself was the author of a multivolume work 
entitled The Machine Tool. An Interlingual Dictionary of Basic Concepts (London 1976). 
Machine tools truly are such as to manifest characteristics identifiable in encounters of 
similars – because they have been manufactured as such. Vocabulary itself is treated by 
Wüster and his TC 37 followers “as if it could be standardised in the same way as types of 
paint and varnish or aircraft and space vehicles” [13, p. 12].
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Certainly, there are also non-artefactual objects in the Wüsterian universe. As ISO/IEC 
JTC1 SC36 N0579 (for example) puts it:  
an object is defined as anything perceived or conceived. Some objects, concrete objects 
such as a machine, a diamond, or a river, shall be considered material; other objects 
are to be considered immaterial or abstract, such as each manifestation of financial 
planning, gravity, flowability, or a conversion ratio; still others are to be considered 
purely imagined, for example, a unicorn, a philosopher’s stone or a literary character. 
[14] 
Unfortunately such elucidations are so vague as to leave the putative user of the 
corresponding standards in the dark. Are processes objects? Are they concrete or abstract? 
Are characteristics objects? Are concepts objects? Are dispositions, functions, limbs, body 
cavities, blood flow, apoptosis, or types of pus, objects? Are they concrete or abstract? 
Material or immaterial? Real or imagined? The ISO literature still leaves us with no 
coherent means to provide answers to such questions, and this in spite of the fact that the 
task of creating a principled framework in which such answers could be given is of 
increasing importance to the future of medical coding and of the EHR. In the document just 
cited, however, in which real objects such as rivers are placed on the same level as 
imagined objects such as unicorns, ISO makes it clear what it thinks of the importance of 
this task for the future of terminology research:  
In the course of producing a terminology, philosophical discussions on whether an 
object actually exists in reality … are to be avoided. Objects are assumed to exist and 
attention is to be focused on how one deals with objects for the purposes of 
communication. [14, emphasis added]  
As we have argued at length elsewhere, however [5], it is precisely such philosophical 
discussions which are required if we are to undo the sore effects of Wüster’s influence. 
4. How Medical Terms Are Introduced 
The typical scenario for the introduction of new terms into medical language is as follows. 
A new disease or virus is encountered in reality, and the communities involved recognize 
that they need some way to refer to the newly discovered kind as they encounter its succes-
sive instances. Agreement is then reached in these and those languages that these and those 
terms should be used henceforth to refer to instances of this kind of entity.
In terminology circles, however, the demand is now raised to add in addition some third 
thing: the corresponding concept. Because concepts themselves are ethereal in nature, they 
require the support of something else – namely definitions – to enable terminology users 
and associated software applications to gain access to them. At the same time the 
definitions thus created serve henceforth to restrict the sorts of entities that can be admitted 
as falling under the corresponding concepts.
In areas like manufacturing or commerce the purpose of standardization is precisely to 
bring about a situation in which entities in reality (such as machine parts, or contracts) are 
indeed required to conform to certain agreed-upon standards. Such a requirement is how-
ever alien to the world of medicine, where it is the entities in reality which must serve in 
every case as benchmark. Even in medicine, however, terminologists have been encouraged 
to focus on concepts and definitions rather than on the corresponding entities in reality.  
We can now understand more precisely why so many of the medical ‘concepts’ in 
terminologies like SNOMED-CT remain undefined. The reason turns on the way in which 
medical terms are introduced into our language. Such terms reflect entities in reality for 
which we characteristically have access to only a small fraction of the relevant biological or 
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clinical features. Almost all disorder terms are introduced, not because we already have a 
clear definition reflecting known characteristics, but because we have a pool of cases.
This means that many medical terms are introduced before their users have any 
‘conceptual’ understanding of what they mean. These users are however able to grasp what 
they designate in reality: they can see the relevant entities before them in the lab or clinic.  
5. An Ontological Basis for Coding Systems and the EHR 
There are many who hold that it will suffice to establish communication standards for the 
EHR if we can only establish a way to refer unambiguously to “concepts” as units of 
knowledge agreed upon by domain experts and defined in formal ways. As we hope to have 
shown in the foregoing, this detour through “concepts” – at least as realized in the domain 
of biomedicine – represents rather an alien accretion of what we can only call International
Standard Bad Philosophy. It is time, we believe, to pursue new means of conceiving the 
relation of terms to medical reality in which the detour through concepts is abandoned and 
in which we draw instead on the best theories and tools which contemporary philosophy 
has to offer – and this means above all the right sort of ontology, an ontology that is able 
explicitly and unambiguously to relate to the universal types or kinds in reality as well as to 
the individual tokens (such as you and me) which are their instances.  
The principal task of medical terminology systems is to represent such universal types or 
kinds, and the principal task of the EHR is to represent the corresponding instances. Our 
proposal, then, is to develop an ontology in which these two kinds of representations are 
tied together from the start, without the detour through the realm of concepts.  
Note that we are not hereby claiming that to establish the ontology of the world of 
biomedical universals and instances will be a simple task. There is, as is clear, no single 
unified perspective on which all reasonable persons must agree if they would only open 
their eyes. Hence the popularity of T. S. Kuhn’s ideas on conflicting paradigms, and hence 
the influence of Wüster’s own ideas on what he sees as the human-induced arbitrariness 
involved in the “construction” of both objects and concepts. Against both Kuhn and 
Wüster, however, we see these matters precisely in terms of the existence of a plurality of 
different perspectives on one and the same world – perspectives corresponding, for 
example, to the different life science disciplines and to different biomedical terminologies. 
It is because of the immense complexity of this one world that it is accessible to us only in 
terms of a wide variety of such different perspectives.  
On our view, however, some terminologies are to be preferred to others because they 
project onto the world beyond in a way which enjoys a higher level of correctness or 
adequacy to the universals or kinds in reality. On the view of Wüster and his followers, in 
contrast, there is no independent benchmark in relation to which concept-systems could be 
established as correct, and thus also no independent fulcrum in terms of which concept-
systems could be integrated together in robust fashion. On our view such integration can be 
attained precisely because perspectives are projected onto this common independent reality, 
which embraces entities at all levels of granularity, from the molecule to population [15].  
Our approach does not, be it noted, ignore the psychological and linguistic dimensions of 
the application of medical terms. Indeed, it takes great pains to ensure that its categories 
apply to the world itself in all salient dimensions, including beliefs and observations, 
utterances and terms. It is thus in a position to make it crystal clear, in relation to all the 
clinical data registered in EHRs, whether entities in the associated coding systems refer to 
diseases, or to statements made about diseases, or to acts on the part of physicians, or to 
documents in which such acts are recorded, or to observations of such acts, or to 
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statements about such observations. In this respect, too, it is opposed to the established 
approaches to the construction of coding systems for use in the EHR in recent years.  
6. Conclusion
The application of a sound realist ontology to the domain of healthcare can make coding 
systems both logically more coherent and also more closely compatible with our 
commonsensical intuitions about the medically salient objects and processes in reality. It 
can thus not only help in detecting errors in existing coding systems but also, by allowing 
the formulation of intuitive principles for the creation and maintenance of such systems, 
help in avoiding similar errors in the future [16]. 
To achieve the requisite coding systems and the associated EHR architecture will of 
course require a huge effort, since the relevant standards need to be overhauled from the 
ground up by experts who are cognizant of the need for clarity and familiar with the 
methods of sound ontology. Even before that stage is reached, however, there is the 
problem of making all constituent parties – including patients, healthcare providers, system 
developers and decision makers – aware of how deep-seated the existing problems are. 
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